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EXAMINATION OF PURPOSES FOR VATER PRICIN' 
These lectures will not deal with Riparian situations. We assume some 
-rights- to water that precludes bidding or auctioning of use rights each 
year. What is at stake is not the use of water itself; we are also 
interested in the facilities necessary to store and convey it to where it 
is needed. How far.ers utilize water might be expected to depend merely on 
whether they pay anth1ng for it. The til1ling of when payaents are 
calculated aay not be very influential. 
1. There will a 1 ways be some revenue co 11 ected in some form, because there 
is a continuing need to pay operating and .a1ntenance charges. 
a. Sometimes these payments are in kind and not in cash. 
b. Fulfilling this need does not have to involve the State. 
2. The only other reasons for collections by-the··· State ~: obtain 
general revenues, recover costs of facilities, regulate use of 
.~ 
res 0 u r c e s(" ~n d reg u 1 ate use 0 f a wa t err e sou r c e t hat h a ~ e n p r 1 vat ely 
appropriated. 
3. The above reasons are all interconnected. 
a. Collections for general revenue purposes mayor may not influence 
planning. construction. efficient use. and cost recovery of new 
facilities. As far as long-run resource allocation is concerned. 
collections lIIade to recover cost of facilities lIIay or Inay not add 
to general revenues. 
b. Collections, for general~. will always affect rate of use 
of resources in the short run. This is because the price acts as a 
tax, and this tends to cutback usage. If the levy is lIade at the 
start of the irrigation season. the amount of revenue coll ected 
will be a function of the slope of the demand curve for water (not 
precisely accurate) at the start of the season. Water demand from 
storage or in river flows will be cutback by such charges. 
However, the individual water units actually taken during the 
season will be treated as though they are free and that the cost of 
purchasing them have already been incurred. If the levy is made on 
units of water delivered throughout the season. there may be some 
cutback on use in certain parts of the season. Collections will 
always add to the general revenue. 
A water tax lIIight generate considerable revenue and create some 
water ·savings· that can be used to supply other farmers--probable 
sup P 1 1 esc a n b e s w 1 t c h e dar o·u n d - - but h a v e sma 1 1 e f f e c ton act u a 1 
usage during a season, since the cost by that time will be treated 
as sunk. If the tax is high enough, water demanders will cut 
the",selves back to where expected deliveries will be equal to or 
less than expected consumptive use by the crops. Users may switch 
to sprinklers (divert loss water) or they ",ay agree to pay the tax 
while bringing Inore land in under a different ",ode of irrigation. 
c. Revenue collections could be justified for the saine reasons that 
land taxes are justified--certain persons in society are in control 
of certain production assets that are ilnportant to everybody. 
Property has often been taxed, and sOlne form of rights to water 
availability could be treated as property. S1m1larly,;f land is 
rented from the State water could be, too. Water taxes might not 
be too hard to collect, because user groups are often 1nvol ved and 
may operate as the collection agent. 
d. Collections could be made to recover costs of facilities. Paying 
for any investment always causes some confusion. The first 
consideration is the time period before any resources are committed 
to the investment. During this period, risk and potential payoffs 
are assu~ed, and benefit/cost ratios are calculated based upon 
expected selling prices of the proposed production. In the private 
sector, if all goes well, the investors will meet expenses, recover 
capital with interest, and earn additional profit--if lucky. In 
this -ease, the may roll their capital over into another round of 
investment. If they are unlucky, they lose capital or bankrupt and 
are driven out of the industry. In otherwords, they cover their 
capital costs until all their invested capital wears out • 
. As we have seen earlier, many issues are involved when public sources 
are to be committed: What are the arguments for the investment? How did a 
particular irrigation design get proposed in the first place? lsi t 
adequate? What is to be the rol e of subsidy? Society can define 
efficiency anJway it pleases--and if it chooses to provide a lot of subsidy 
by not charging for facilities, there is nothing inmoral about that 
decision other than failure to recognize that someone, somewhere will have 
to bear to cost of subsidy. 
Once a decision has been made to recover costs of faci l1ties, a 
certain type of reasoning app 1 ies: the schedule of charges to be levied 
may be expected to cover full costs to society or recover those costs 
society says ~ust be recovered. Let us see how recovery is viewed in -
pri vate firm (add in the differences made by ~onopol ies). 
Once a facility has been built we move into the time period after the 
resources have been co .... itted and into the period of sunk costs. As we 
havee seen in the private case, if planned de .. and d~es not materialize, the 
firm does the best it can to cover variable costs and recover any portion 
of fixed costs possible. The firm does this by accepting any prices above 
average variable cost and produces where price • marginal cost.!..!:., if it 
can control price, it cutsback until the new .. arginal revenue • marginal 
cos ·t are all coverd (as in Jlonopo ly). 
1. A public entity with lack of demand cannot do quite the same thing. 
While it tends to have monopoly (price setting) power, it would prefer 
output to be as though there were co~petition. Thi s wou 1 d put output 
where price • ~arginal cost. This is due to the relationship between 
sunk costs and society's opportunity cost. If society's sunk costs 
cannot be recovered, the best use of resources is to cover variable 
costs as well as possible. In so~e extreme cases, the variable costs 
are very low or nil--the use of a bridge or railroad tunnel might not 
cost society anything once the resources are committed. 1ft he 
opportunity cost to society is low or zero. prices should be the same 
in order to encourage use. This is the philisophical foundation for 
lI'Iarginal-cost pricing. 
z. If the free use of the facility is so great that it becoll'les congested. 
individual begin to rise. but it can be shown that the 
.. arginal social costs rise even faster. and that efficient use of the 
facility requires a toll to be levied on use equal to the difference 
"between marginal and average social costs. 
The conveyance facilities of our irrigation systems are somewhat like 
a footbridge or a railroad tunnel; there is a lI'Iaximum amount that can flow. 
* given the pipe or cannal dimensions and the water level. 
In sOlie cases storage may seem excessi yet even to protect against 
drouth, and observers lI'Iay think that prices should be lowered in order to 
utilize lI'Iore water. However. the governing criteria is how much mwater can 
be put through the sll'lal lest part of the system--where the maximum value is 
aChieved, prices are low enough. Further lowering will not encourage more 
* Where 1Ad~vidwll decisions are controlling -flow,- the congestion can 
become so great as to cause total stoppage. 
throughput even if actua 1 lIarginal costs (opportunity costs) are lower. By 
the same token, there is no autol1atic guarantee that raising prices will 
cut the flow, at least up to some point. Generally, this max1l1um thoughput 
will be achieved very quickly as the project stages up to full-land and 
water utilization. Thus, the most genreal rule is that manipulation of 
·water prices· caRnet affect the efficiency of conveyance facility use 
since the fa-c1lity runs at capacity and the farl1ers are not on a del1and 
systell. When there is space in the systel1, it is because water is being 
deliberately held back--(dall) or the streall source has fallen in volulle. 
A demand systel1 is analagous to purchasing electr1c1ty--the users only 
purchase varying amounts when and if they choose. In the U.S.A., the water 
utilized for home consumption is on demand systems. Two features are 
1nvol ved: 1) the usage is metered and 2) dellland tends to COlne in peaks; 
thus, capacity (storage and deli very) must be adequate to serv ice the peak 
loads--at all other times the system has underuti lized capacity. 
The classic efficiency problem and its solution, when users must 
finance such a system, is well known. The problelll is to entice users to 
switch use to nonpeak periods. This is sol ved by marginal-cost pricing, in 
other words, lowering tariffs to encourage uti 11zat1on. However, marg1nal-
cost pricing does not cover capital costs under such circumstances; 
equ1p.ent wears out, and there is no real division for depreciation or 
interest return on invested capital. To solve th1s last problem, a lump-
su. pay.ent 1s required of users . who j01n the system. Th1s payment can 
take the form of a meter charge, a ·hook-up· fee, etc. 
The result1ng structure composed of a lu.p su. to cover 1mportant 
capital costs, plus a slid1ng fee related to marginal costs of measured use 
at certa1n periods, is call ed a two-part tari ff. [Note that it 1s 
underut111zed capacity that creates a s1tuation where additional use can be 
obtained at low or zero social opportunity cost.] 
Obv10usly, the typ1cal irrigat10n system 1s not a demand system--a 
demand system may be a necess1ty in electrical, natural gas, or other 
public ut111ty de11very serv1ces, but it is a luxury 1n 1rrigation. 
A road that requ1res toll s to reduce congest10n w111 earn rents that 
1n the pr1vate world are the ·green light- to further development. Once 
* The definition of economic efficiency is that as long as social 
opporun1ty costs are below what people are wi 1 ling to pay--output should be 
expanded by lowering price. 
the rents are being obtained and interpreted as effective demand for 
additional road space, a pecu liar thing happens. Current ly, the toll is 
too h 1 g h to con t r 0 1 flo w. Hex t, a new r 0 ad 1 s b u 1 1 t par all e 1 tot he old. 
Two roads are now available to handle the demand. Congestion fa 11 s off; 
there is no need, on efficiency grounds, to set such h1-gh toll. In fact, a 
high toll does not generate any revenue since people switch back to the low 
cost original road which is now uncongested. The new low, or no toll, for 
the two roads, set according to the social opportunity cost of ayerage 
traYel, will not generate enough money to pay for the new road. 
* surplus capacity, and, again, the way out is a two-part tariff. 
There is 
In the case of a full cannal, as we haye seen, the flow is as full as 
the source will permit. There is no necessary connection between revenues 
c h a r g e d an d e f fe c t i v e de 1ft and; rev e n u e s II a y or 1ft a y no t b e 1 n t e r pre ted as 
indicators of need for further development. Further development Iftay be 
impossible due to the size or availability of the source. If a parallel 
facility is technically feasible and runs at capacity, recovery of costs 
can be attempted in whatever way seems most reasonable and equitable.* If 
* The cap 1 tal c h a r g e s lit 1 g h t bel e vie don c e per yea r up and r i v e r s wh 0 
habitually utilize the roads during peak or congested hours. 
the facil ity has genuine excess capacity. a two-part tariff might work to 
encourage more use of the facilities. 
1. Efficieny of use at farm level cannot use charges to make facility 
efficiency go up. The question now is, whether charges can make the 
on-farM level efficiency of use rise? This is like asking whether the 
final consumers' consuAlpt1on of electricity is wasteful. In this case, 
w.e argue that they can use what they paid for as thye pleases. Where 
farMers are concerned, we cannot say that, because we want to increase 
'0 u t put and to use deli v ere d wa t era s we 1 1 asp 0 s sib 1 e. Her ewe run 
into a potential contr1d1ct1on, in that, to obtain efficient 
conveyance-system usage we lower prices to social opportunity cost 
1 eve 1 sin 0 r d e r t 0 cur b was teo nth e far m. We want higher and, 
yet, we want higher unit pricesl* Luck11y, as we have seen, fiddling 
with prices won't affect system use efficiency; so, all we are left 
with is on-farm water use efficiency. 
* However, the congested road is on ly possil be because the ·source- of 
the flow can be made larger or smaller by "individual decisions of whether 
or not to travel froll A to B. A water source is a constant (except for low 
flow times) on a river systell and the roal (pipe) is sized to handle its 
invaried output. This is one way the road or tunnel analogy breaks down. 
Efficient use is technically defined according to consumptive use 
requirements of crops. 
Crops can only utilize so much water. If the amount available is 
-adequate- or -over-adequate,- any excess percu lates to underground 
aquifers or returns to some river system where other irrigators can use it. 
If More -efficient- irrigation is practiced, for whatever reason, this 
.eans less water is diverted and restdull used elsewhere (more rapidly than 
when waiting for it to appear via overland return) or .ore land is 
irrigated with the same amount of water and reduction of overland return 
and irrigated land elsewhere. Raising water prices might have an effect on 
this type of ·efficiency,· (where the potential gains are measured by the 
production, if any, foregone if water is ·wastefu lly- app lied in one area, 
.!!!' for some reasons, the overland return is not used elsewhere. 
Excepting such special cases, the collection of increased charges may 
help finance an on-going project, or even raise general revenue, but the 
* When American public utilities and government leaders called for 
American to ·conserve- energy usage, the natural excess capcity of the 
energy delivery systems was effectively increased. Revenues fell and the 
companies asked for rate increases to cover capital costs. As a result, 
individual attained a redu~ed amount of electricity or natural gas for the 
same or more money. Not all the cutbacks were a response to higher prices; 
of course, a cycle of raising prices and cutting consumption is self-
reinforcing. 
collective will have little or no meaning in ter~s of increasing net 
production. It might be supposed that designed capacities are not adequate 
to satisfy comsumptive use requirements. This is a common situation. 
Farmers do not have enough water and must decide whether to short all crops 
or leave some land unp lanted in order to concentrate more water to less 
space. This decision automatically forces famres to make an efficiency of 
water-use decision. In a water-short situation, a system of water charges 
will not effect efficiency of use one way or another. There is no ·waste· 
to c ·ontrol. If a system of charges is overlaid on top of inadequate 
supplies the goal can only be to tax for general revenue. Payments will be 
res 1 s ted or w 11 1 h a v e to be set at 1 eve 1 S co 11m ens era t e wit h pro f 1 tab 11 1 t y 
situation of the farmers. At the same time, it must be realized that any 
level of charge that actually reduces levels of use below what would be 
justified by society's opportunity cost is too high. 
This reinforces the general observation that fees to collect revenue 
and the efficiency goal of benefiting fro~ sunk costs where society's 
opporating costs are low may be l1utally exclusive. What project planners 
may fail to account for is that a ·well designed- surface project will 
throw-off water which will be used elsewhere, outside the project, as 
suppl iMent or for new land. The only way this won't occur is if the 
project is designed for sprink lers in the first place. Then efficiency of 
use would not be an issue. Planners should view on farm efficiency in 
drainage w1de terms--not li1111ted to the spec1fic project of the1r 
respons1b1l1t1es. If project planners feel project farlllers are wastefu 1 
and cause farlllers to be lIore -eff1c1ent-, e1ther lIore land will be opened 
up 1n the project (clos1ng down land outs1de) or lower d1vers10ns w1l 1 move 
more water quickly to downstream users. 
Fees can be set to cover project costs or obtain revenues 1n a lIanner 
appropr1ate to the s1tuat10n. The charges, 1f general, w11l create the 
general il1pact of any tax, cut product10n,and ra1se pr1ces to a greater or 
lesser degree. Spec1f1c charges lev1ed on p~rt1cular projects 
benef1c1ar1es can be lev1ed on a lump-sum bas1s by sett1ng contracts w1th 
annaul paYllents. In some cases, account 1s taken of the cubic meters 
de11vered and a charge/unit is collected. As mentioned earlier, these 
charges lIIay affect lIIarginal costs, and, therefore, cutback individual 
consumption (the residual will be used elsewhere and mayor may not be 
subject to the special fees to recover project costs). 
In sUllllaary, the general situation is that fiddling prices will not 
effect efficiency of conveyance faci lity; the process will not affect 
global drainage production at the far .. level if water supplies are 
adequate, and, if they are adequate, scarcity will create its own 
efficiency. 
The previous few paragraphs generally apply to irrigation in the 
private sector. 
s u c h f a-c i lit i e s '" a y 0 r 1ft a y not rep res en t cap ita lin v est men t s t hat .. us t 
be repaid in order to prevent financial losses. Hore likely, the 
facilities are quite old and their use 1l11poses no social cost of an 
appreciable nature on society, and their owners have had -good- use of 
the III. Thus, from either a private or public standpoint, the more the 
facilities are used the better. 
Obviously, it is possible, in some cases, that lIIore water is diverted 
and applied to crops than consumptive use requires. Again, whether this 
represents wasteful use depends upon the hydrology of the total system and 
what use is made of return flows by other irrigators. As we have seen, a 
system of charges maya 1 ter techno logy and bring in more 1 and or cutback 
d 1 v e r s ion sin ace r t a 1 n are a. Depending on the entire irrigation pattern 
of a drainage, either response will trigger downstreal1 impact observed as 
less land irrigated. The salle amount or . sl1ght expansion of land all 
depended upon how lIuch water actua lly reaches them and how they in term 
react to the tax. 
The More general situation is that existing water systells do not 
d1 vert ·excess· water, they tend to streach a 11 the water they can get and 
users feel that they need additional water. The user group is constrained 
by ~hortage to do the best it can. Again, efficiency of water use is 
guaranteed by phys1ca 1 shortage. Fees simply raise revenue. New 
techniques will be introduced if the crops are valuable and if the water 
begins to cos.t some money. 
Water charges may be levied as public leaders see fit, but the reasons 
for such levies would mostly turn on desires to collect general revenue 
since neither efficiency nor system cost recovery is at stalee. Reasoning 
based upon argullents of achieving greater efficiency in resource use, as we 
have seen, are unlikely to be valid except in special situations where the 
downstream hydrology is such as to prevent reuse or there are no downstream 
users, etc. The irony of these special situations is that it malees no 
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difference if water is ·wasted· or not; if there is no further use who 
cares? The hydrologic cycle will replace it next year or some ·excess· 
!light be held in storage if the system includes the requisite faci lities. 
Water-use efficiency in private systell'ls based on individual pUll'lping 
froll underground or river sources in controlled by pumping costs vs. the 
consumptive needs of the crop. The only way too much water will be used is 
if pUllping costs are very low and water is ·substituted· for other inputs 
(when in doubt use more water) or if a lIistake in lIade in judging the 
amount and tilling of water needed by the crops. 
1. The pricing structure probably lI'Iust be controlled by any decisions to 
recover some system costs. The pricing situation probably will not 
affect systell'l efficiency and probably will not affect on farm 
efficiency basin-wide systems although it might affect water use on a 
gi ven project. 
a. Efficiency in facility use mayor lIIay not be harmonious with 
cOll'lsull'lptive needs of crops. Harginal cost pricing of facility 
users would move 1I0re water through the system. Farmers might 
treat water as the cheapest 1nput(and create a lot of overland 
return). No general effect on basin-wide efficiency. 
2. Whether pricing can effect efficient use of facility depends on whether 
or not they run at capacity. 
3. Wheter pricing can affect overall eff1cent use at the farm level 
depends on particular and possibly unillportnat situations, i.e., no 
reuse (if no reuse, who clres). As long as wlter is reused, it is 
stretched to achieve efficiency. If it cannot be reused, due to under 
supply, what ever is possible It any point in the systell is achieved 
all down the line. 
4. Water charges may s1l1p ly be asorbed if supp lies are tight. If 
alternative in crops and are Ivaillble, the charge lilY 
force a search for higher yield through changed technique. otherwise 
charges sillply shift use sOllewhere else. If they are high enough, even 
ina • Ide qUI t e • sur f ace s y s' t e In t e c h n 1 que II a y c han g e , and t his w 11 l ' be 
in use shifts. 
If less is diverted. downstreall users lIay Ictual ly hive MOFe 
water, since lower upstream run-o ff Illy lIean 1 ess percu 1 ates into the 
Iguifer. 
5. Recovery of the construction costs of large public works costs are 
often thought to be unharmonious with their effective uti l1zation. once 
costs are sunk. However. in the irrigation case. costs allocated to 
farl1ers for co 11 ection l1ay be co 11 ected in many cases without reguard 
for efficiency il1pacts upon the conveyance system or at the farm level. 
We have talked about efficiency in water use or managel1ent. Thus far. 
we have concentrated on efficiency in utilization of the conveyance systel1 
and at the farlft level. other concepts of the effeciency are certainly 
involved. such as. the overall engineering concepts or possibly the 
P h y sic a 1 .a nag e 1ft en t 0 f t .h est 0 rag e fa c i 1 i tie s 0 r coo din a t ion wit h 
hydropower generation. In addition. there is also the notion of being able 
to shift and 110ve water between systems and over large areas according to 
changing agricultural needs or possibly other nonagricultural needs. 
In the Western U.S.A •• this question has received considerable 
attention. because economic development has tended to reduce the need for 
agricultural water and increase the del1and for municipal and individual 
supp lies. This alteration in the structure of water demand would not 
create any problems except for the fact that the flows or avai labi 1 ities of 
most water sources have been appropriated by public or pri vate entities. 
Thus, in order to satisfy a new demand, there must be a redefinition of the 
terms of existing water rights or the rights must be transferable.* 
But transfers must be approved because shifting diversion points have 
il1pacts on other users and potential conflicts must be resolved. Thus, 
·ri ghts· do not trade at will in the Market. In ear l1er t1l11es, of course, 
the appropriation doctrine .1ght have been looked upon as a deliberate 
l1ethod to rel10ve a vital resource frOM the norl1al workings of the .arket in 
the nal1e of equity. 
Nowadays, the idea is that people or institutions who need water will 
look towards agriculture for a low cost supply that can be transferred to 
uses upon which society places higher values. 
* transfer unduely is, therefore, inefficient. 
The system that restricts 
One of the most difficult real-world problems in irrigation water 
utilization is encountered in many ·unstructured· situations; users at the 
* There is some scope for appropriating additional water if winter run-
off can be utilized. Control of winter run-off, so it can be utilized all 
year, requires adequate and costly storage. 
*In societies that do not grant -rights· they can 110ve water at wil 1--
on paper. In practice, they have to be careful. In practice, they have all 
the problems of ba lancing water uses, quantity, and qua lity concerns that 
the U.S.A. has. They are forced to set ru les by which command decisions 
can be made. Some rules may be codified in water law. 
head of the ditch get lI'Iore water than those at the end. A common 
observation is that the farmers have all'lple or ·excess· water, the latter do 
not ha ve enough. In other situations this never happens, because, one way 
or another, control s are 1l1'1p 0 sed to present such practice. 
What role can imposition of fees play in exercising such control? 
To control water use at the head of a ditch with a lump-sum payment 
would require special charges on head and users. The result would be two 
types of payments or water-fee collections alllong the saMe user groups. In 
add '1 t ion, a s w e h a v e see n , a 1 u m p - sum t a x , a t say the s tar t 0 f e a c h 
irrigation season, would be treated by the farll'lers as a fixed cost of 
annua 1 production. Once paid, it would not effect the level of use during 
the season. A strong physical Monltoring system would be required during 
all irrigation periods. If fees are imposed on the basis of units of wat~r 
de li vered, those who use the IIIOSt will pay the 1110 st, and the effect shou 1 d 
be to cause water used to be cutback. Thus, more water will stay in the 
* d itch for other users. 
Again, the unit measurement must be checked on or enforced and fees 
collected. These lIust be on the basis of human supervision. That being 
the case, equity in water use anywhere in the system can be control led 
direct ly by inspection of ·d1tch riders·, no fees are necessary to sol ve 
the head-end/ta11-end problem. In fact equity will only be served by 
r e cog nit 1 on 0 f the con t r 0 1 s n e c e s sa r y to 11 ve 1 n a co 1 1 e c t 1 v e. The p r 111'1 e 
purpose for fees could be concentrated upon repayment of system 
construction costs or f~r other purposes. 
Extra heavy water use at the head-end of a ditch cannot be sol ved by 
charging for water. Unless, the actual water entering the farm headgate a 
can be .elsured and recorded.· Otherwise, hu.an .0n1tor1ng and control is 
required. 
* Water lI'Ieters are designed into the planned on-farll'l sprinkler 
development in the Hajes Project, Peru. 
